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ABSTRACT 
Technology-driven payment instruments and services are facilitating the development 
of e-commerce; however, security concerns beleaguer their implementation, 
particularly in developing countries. This article considers the limits of private ordering 
in the regulation of e-payment systems. We use Nigeria to exemplify a developing 
country that is increasingly pushing for adoption of a regulatory framework for e-
payment systems based on private ordering. We argue that although technical 
standards and self-regulation by the financial industry are important, the law is an 
essential regulatory mechanism that is largely missing. This article proposes that law 
be used as a mechanism to set and compel compliance with technical and industry 
standards, thus building trust, catering to public interest concerns and legitimising the 
regulatory process. 
Keywords E-payments, Regulation, Private ordering, Public interest, Nigeria 
INTRODUCTION  
2YHUWKHSDVWGHFDGHD³VLOHQWUHYROXWLRQ´LQSD\PHQWV\VWHPVKDVRFFXUUHGZLWKWKH
introduction and implementation of e-payment systems. Aided by the rapid proliferation 
of information and technology, it has not been without inherent problems. Although e-
payment systems have enhanced interoperability, convergence, and competition in 
the payment industry ² and, from a user's point of view, efficiency and flexibility ² the 
ensuing migration to the systems has aggravated the risk of cybercrime and 
undermined trust and confidence in payment services and their providers.1 Likewise, 
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banks and other providers of e-payment services have become more susceptible to 
large-scale data breaches, while users face the risk of financial losses from identity 
theft and fraud. Therefore, effective e-payment regulation is central to building trust 
and confidence in electronic transactions, particularly for developing countries in their 
bid to bridge the digital gap and leverage the benefits of the global market.  
The European Central Bank defines e-payments aptly as payments made over the 
internet using remote payment card transactions, online banking systems or e-
payment providers with which the consumer has set up individual accounts.2  Nigeria 
is a good example of a developing nation that is increasingly pushing for the adoption 
of these systems.3 As recent government policies demonstrate, the objectives include 
developing internationally recognised payment systems
 
and achieving global digital 
market integration.
4
 Thus, migration to card transactions and other electronic 
payments have increased. However, with the migration, Nigeria now faces significant 
challenges in securing payments. Because of its rather unsavoury reputation related 
to scams, advance fee fraud, identity theft, and cybercrime in general, there is a 
shadow of suspicion over electronic transactions and communications originating from 
or terminating in the country.
5
 Effective regulation of the relatively new e-payment 
systems could, therefore, represent a significant aspect of building trust and controlling 
crimes in e-payment systems.  
In this article, we argue that as presently constituted, regulation in Nigeria focuses 
                                                          
1 See European Commission, Towards an Integrated European Market for Card, Internet and 
Mobile Payments (COM 941 2011) para 2.3.  
2 European Central Bank, The Payment System, 2010 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/paymentsystem201009en.pdf (last accessed 
12/06/2017); see also Ofcom, Innovation in UK consumer electronic payments: A 
collaborative study by Ofcom and the Payment Systems Regulator, 
2014https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/45041/e-payments.pdf (last 
accessed 12/06/2017) 
3 2WKHUFRXQWULHVSDUWLFXODUO\LQ$IULFDDUHDOVRLQYROYHGLQWKLVGULYHIRULQVWDQFH.HQ\D¶V0-
pesa is the largest market for mobile money; South Africa has the most developed e-
payment systems in Africa; and Ghana and Tanzania are pushing for wider adoption of e-
payment systems; see e.g. KPMG, Payment Developments in Africa (2015) vol. 1 available 
at: https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/za/pdf/2016/09/Payment-Developments-in-
Africa-2015.pdf (last accessed 20/12/2016) 
4 These include National Payment Systems Vision (NPSV) 2020 developed by the federal 
government and the cashless policy of the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
5
 '6PLWK³1LJHULDQ6FDPVDV3ROLWLFDO&ULWLTXH*OREDOL]DWLRQ,QHTXDOLW\DQG´LQ5*ULQNHU
S Lubkemann, and C Steiner (eds.) Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History, & 
Representation (2010, Blackwell Publishers) 617 at 616-628. 
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exclusively on technology-based solutions and Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standards (PCIDSS)
6
, an industry private ordering not supported by any mandatory 
legal requirements. This approach is unsustainable for three reasons: One, e-
payments are a multi-stakeholder environment comprising banks, financial and non-
financial institutions. As such, a private ordering arrangement designed for banks and 
other financial institutions may not be effective outside that industry unless it is 
recognized as applicable and binding. Two, the technical standards on which the 
system depends are inefficient because there are no laws mandating security 
standards or compliance with the standards. Three, there are serious public interest 
concerns that limit the effectiveness of private ordering. In the context of e-payments, 
public interest concerns include controlling cybercrime and correcting market failures, 
as well as the need for fairness, transparency, and clarity in the adjudication and 
administration of justice.7  
 We argue that law is crucial to engendering efficiency and legitimacy of e-
payment regulation because of its capacity to regulate multiple players in the 
heterogeneous e-payment market and to enforce technical standards. Law plays a 
central role in ensuring that public concerns in e-payment systems are adequately 
addressed. However, since the choice between private ordering and state regulation 
FDQQRWEHELQDU\LQWKHFRPSOH[HQYLURQPHQWRIWKHLQWHUQHWZHXVH/HVVLJ¶VWKHRU\RI
modalities of regulation in cyberspace to highlight how the law would regulate 
efficiently in the context of e-payment systems and services. /HVVLJ¶V PRGHO LV
essential to a critical understanding of our argument that private ordering is inherently 
weak and subject to manipulation by the payment industry. The theory also justifies 
the proposition that regulation through formal rules is better at securing recognition 
and acceptance for regulatory mechanisms, and fostering compliance. 
 The article is structured as follows. The article starts with a brief analysis of how 
private ordering fits into the broader debate on regulation. It then considers the threats 
posed to e-payment systems and how the integration and convergence of e-payment 
and other services undergird the inadequacy of regulation in Nigeria. The paper further 
evaluates the efficiency of industry-mandated technical standards and the PCIDSS as 
                                                          
6 PCIDSS is a proprietary information security standard for organizations that handle 
branded credit cards from the major cards including Visa, MasterCard, American 
Express, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security/ accessed 23/11/2016. 
7
 The concept of public interest is discussed in the next section. 
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a private ordering mechanism. We argue that while private ordering can be quite 
efficient, it is inherently limited in heterogeneous markets and seldom caters to public 
interest. Therefore, to achieve the non-efficient goals of regulation, government needs 
to constrain private actors. The article concludes with a proposal for a regulatory 
DSSURDFKWKDWPRGHOV/HVVLJ¶V WKHRUy of modalities of regulation in cyberspace. We 
UHIRUPXODWH/HVVLJ¶Vregulatory modalities of code, market, norms, and law to develop 
a proposal that incorporates technologies, users, industry, and law. We argue that a 
correct synthesis of these modalities leads to efficient regulation of e-payment 
processes, instruments, and institutions, legitimises the regulatory process, and 
addresses public interest concerns.  
REGULATION BY PRIVATE ORDERING ± LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
CONCERNS 
The meaning and scope of regulation is varied and contested. Morgan and Yeung, 
have argued that ³UHJXODWLRQLVDSKHQRPHQRQWKDWLVQRWRULRXVO\GLIILFXOWWRGHILQHZLWK
clarity and precision, as its meaning and the scope of its inquiry are unsettled and 
FRQWHVWHG´8 However, a useful way to navigate the regulatory debate is to consider its 
broad and narrow meanings based on the origin or source of a regulatory framework. 
In a narrow sense, regulation refers to formal legal rules aimed at controlling the 
behaviour of entities or individuals.9 This so-called command and control model of 
regulation implies regulation by law or at least by state-appointed actors with the 
objective of benefiting society or a section of society. In a broader sense, regulation 
refers to any form of behavioural control, whatever its origin.10 This notion of 
regulation includes both state and non-state actors and includes all forms of social and 
economic influence designed to affect behaviour, whether it is state-based, from 
markets, or self-regulatory mechanisms in professions or trades.11  
 Private ordering refers to rules, regulations, and codes of practice developed 
by private actors ² such as industry, firms, and sectors ² to influence behaviour within 
                                                          
8 B Morgan and K Yeung An Introduction to Law and Regulation ( 2007 CUP) at 3. 
9 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(2nd ed. 2012 OUP) at 3 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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the firm, sector, or industry.12 Private actors often voluntarily adopt codes and rules 
are observed without government sanction and enforcement.13 The PCIDSS is an 
example of private ordering in the payment industry. PCIDSS is an established global 
standard for cardholder account protection across all parties in the payment chain, 
including acquirers, third-party processors, and merchants.14 Its core framework 
consists of 12 requirements organised under six functional goals and requires a 
combination of physical, technical, and operational measures to protect cardholder 
data whether in storage or transmission.15 The standard was developed in response 
to increasing incidents of cardholder account theft and is intended to help 
organisations proactively protect customer account data.16 
 The purported legitimacy of private ordering comes from its ability to utilise 
market incentives to allocate public resources.17 Because it can avoid expensive rule-
making and enforcement processes that accompany state regulation, the most 
obvious advantages of private ordering are its efficiency in cost saving and its 
expertise in the rule-making process.18 Conversely, because the rule maker ultimately 
expects compliance from itself, and because compliance with private ordering is 
almost always entirely voluntary, private ordering tends to undermine the 
³FRQVHTXHQFHV´HOHPHQWRI UHJXODWLRQ$OVR because private ordering mechanisms 
can be diffuse ² in that they tend to apply to homogenous sectors and the goals can 
therefore be quite narrow ² private ordering tends to be limited in the way it addresses 
broader issues of public interest. In line with Ogus, we suggest, if tKHWHUP³UHJXODWLRQ´
                                                          
12 They have also been defined more broadly to include rules originated by the private sector 
but put in place by sovereign governments, and rules put in place by private actors by 
government delegation; however, a critical reading of the literature suggests that these more 
aptly describe self-regulation generally and could refer to other models of regulation such as 
co-regulation and meta-regulation. See S 6FKZDU]³3ULYDWH2UGHULQJ´-2003) Nw. U. L. 
Rev VHHDOVR&&RJOLDQHVHDQG(0HQGHOVRQ³0Hta-Regulation and self-5HJXODWLRQ´
(Penn Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-11)1 at 6-9. 
13 Id Schwarcz. 
14 PCI payment Security standard Industry PCI Quick Reference Guide Understanding the 
Payment card Industry Data Security Standard Version 2.0 4 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Schwarcz above note 11 at 319. 
18 6HHJHQHUDOO\.:HEE³8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKH9ROXQWDU\&RGH3KHQRPHQRQ´LQ.:HEEHG
Voluntary Codes: Private Governance and Public Interest and Innovation (Library and 
Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication 2004) 3. 
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is used to denote law that implements a collectivist system, then it must be taken that 
regulation contains the idea of a superior authority, which is the State. It has a directive 
function and compels individuals and groups to behave in particular ways, and 
threatens sanctions if they do not comply. As a public law, it enforces requirements 
that cannot be circumvented by private agreement, because the state plays a central 
role in its formulation. This suggests that the characteristics of sanctions are often 
more noticeable in state or formal regulatory regimes and that state regulation is more 
efficient at modifying behaviour because it carries the threat of state enforcement and 
sanctions. It may also explain why references to regulation in political rhetoric are 
seldom taken to mean non-state regulation.19 Furthermore, as Black defines it, 
UHJXODWLRQ LV³WKHVXVWDLQHGDQGIRFXVHGDWWHPSW WRDOWHU Whe behaviour of others to 
standards or goals with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or 
outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard setting, information gathering 
DQGEHKDYLRXUPRGLILFDWLRQ´20 Therefore, even when non-state actors ² such as social 
norms, technologies, or markets ² influence how regulatory systems operate, and 
while regulatory systems might harness these influences toward a regulatory end, they 
do not themselves constitute regulation.
21
Again, the suggestion here is that formal or 
legal rules are better at setting standards and achieving behaviour modification. 
 Surely, if regulation formally involves interference by a party that is not directly 
involved in or part of the activity involved,22 the legitimacy of private ordering should 
be subject to scrutiny. However, we argue that legitimacy is not necessarily tied to 
rules made by the legislature, and that legitimacy also connotes recognition of the 
source of the rule, confidence in the rule-making process, and acceptance of the 
source and process through compliance with the rules, so we must also look for 
alternative measurements for any claim to legitimacy by private ordering systems.23 
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge provide a broader basis for adjudicating good regulation. 
According to the authors, although legislative mandate, which implies that a regulatory 
                                                          
19 A Ogus Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing 2004), 15. 
20 - %ODFN ³&ULWLFDO 5HIOHFWLRQV RQ 5HJXODWLRQ´   Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 1 at 20 
21 Id. 
22 B M Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, designing, and Removing 
Regulatory Forms (1980, Columbia University Press) at 242. 
23 6HHHJ-RQDWKDQ50DF\³3XEOLFDQG3ULYDWH2UGHULQJDQGWKH3URGXFWLRQRI/HJLWLPDWH
and Illegitimate Rules (1997) 82/5 Cornell Law Review 1123 at 1133. 
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framework derives authorisation from an elected legislature, is one of the essential 
criteria of good regulatory regimes,24 good regulation must also satisfy four additional 
criteria. These are one, accountability and control, which underscores the need for 
regulators to be properly accountable. Two, due process, which presupposes support 
for regulation because the procedures are fair, open, and accessible. Three, regulatory 
expertise, which denotes trusted regulator judgment based upon specialised 
knowledge, skills, and experience; and four, efficiency, which implies that the 
legislative mandate in support of a regulatory regime is being implemented 
effectively.25 In effect, while some of the criteria appear to depend on some formal 
monitoring or enforcement process, others such as regulatory expertise depend more 
on the industry and may arguably be attained by private ordering. Nevertheless, we 
argue that for a regulatory regime to be perceived as good and perhaps legitimate, it 
should satisfy all five criteria.  
 0RUH VLJQLILFDQWO\ VLQFH UDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ WKDW UHJXODWLRQ SURFHHGV LQ WKH ³SXEOLF
LQWHUHVW´ LV RIWHQ DW WKH EDVH RI PRVW UHJXODWRU\ LQVWUuments,26 it is important for 
regulation to account for the public interest components of the regulated activity. As 
0LWQLFNDUJXHVUHJXODWLRQLV³WKHSXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSROLFLQJRIDSULYDWHDFWLYLW\
with respect to a rule prescribed in the public iQWHUHVW´27 Selznik sees regulation as 
³DVXVWDLQHGDQGIRFXVHGFRQWUROH[HUFLVHGE\DSXEOLFDJHQF\RYHUDFWLYLWLHVthat are 
valued by a community´28 and in Lennes' view, the deliberateness and intentionality to 
bring about a regulatory end, which must be seen as a deliberate supervision of private 
activity in the interest of public rights, interests, and welfare, is what qualifies an activity 
as truly regulatory in the first place.
29
 These definitions underline the public interest 
theory of regulation, which justifies regulation as a corrective to perceived deficiencies 
in the operation of the market.30 The theory underpins regulation as a restrictive 
                                                          
24 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge above note 8 at 25. 
25 Id at 25-39. 
26 Mitnick above note 21. 
27 Id at 7. 
28 36HO]QLFN³)RFXVLQJ2UJDQLVDWLRQDO5HVHDUFK5HJXODWLRQ´LQ51ROOHGRegulatory 
Policy and the Social Sciences (1985, University of California Press) at 363.  
29 5/HHQHV³)UDPLQJ7HFKQR-Regulation: An Exploration of State and Non-state Regulation 
E\7HFKQRORJ\´Legisprudence Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No 10/2012 143 at 149. 
30 5$3RVQHU³7KHRULHVRI(FRQRPLF5HJXODWLRQ´1%(5:RUNLQJ3DSHU1RDW 
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activity directed toward private entities on the basis of general rules that are conducive 
to public interest.31   
 It is not our intention to get into the extensive argument about the meaning and 
scope of public interest, yet it is relevant to note that public interest is a contested and 
nebulous concept. Public interest has been described as a vague and indeterminable 
concept,32 and a catch-all phrase for the subjective interest of lawmakers or powerful 
interest groups.33 $FFRUGLQJ WR )HLQWXFN DOWKRXJK ³«public interest has an air of 
democratic propriety, the absence of identifiable normative content renders the 
FRQFHSW LQVXEVWDQWLDODQGKRSHOHVVO\YXOQHUDEOHWRDQQH[DWLRQDQGFRORQL]DWLRQ´34 
Nevertheless, he argues, some common elements of its contents are ascertainable.35 
It is argued that public interest must assume or underpin the existence of some 
interests common to all members of the society and therefore mesh with dominant 
values of the society.36 It underlines certain democratic values and serves as a 
complement to human rights.37 Public interest also assumes an ideal of general 
welfare and maintenance of conditions that permit an ongoing social order.38 
Therefore, the nebulous nature of public interest notwithstanding, it is certainly right to 
assert that in regulatory context, intervention into private activity is justified by 
reference to an economic belief in the efficacy of competitive market forces.39 For 
example, if market efficiency is a public good40 that could arguably be achieved by 
private ordering or self-regulation, it would still ultimately fall on government to regulate 
                                                          
31 -*&KULVWHQVHQ³&RPSHWLQJ7KHRULHVRI5HJXODWRU\*RYHUQDQFH5HFRQVLGHULQJ3XEOLF
,QWHUHVW7KHRU\RI5HJXODWLRQ´ LQ'/HYL-Faur, (ed.) Handbook on the Politics of Regulation 
(2011, Edward Elgar) at 96. 
32 Mitnick above note 21 at 91. 
33 E.g. Posner above note 29 at 4-5.  
34 M Feintuck The public Interest in Regulation (2004, Oxford University Press) at 33. 
35 Id at 38. 
36 Id at 11. 
37 Id at 39. 
38 Id at 39 -41. 
39 Id at 58. 
40 A public good is a commodity the benefit from which is shared by the public as a whole, or 
by a group within it. It consists of two characteristics; one, consumption by one person does 
not leave less for others to consume. Two it is impossible or too costly for the supplier to 
exclude those who do not pay for the good but enjoy the benefit. See Ogus above note 18 at 
33. 
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market efficiency in order to correct market failures. This is because public goods are 
susceptible to free-rider problems.41 In this sense, even if the public interest is 
debatable, it appears that regulation in public interest must seek the welfare and 
protection and benefit of the public at large or at least a section of the society. 
Correspondingly, we can argue that if regulation ultimately controls crimes, prevents 
or corrects market failures, and imbues transparency in adjudication, it is 
unequivocally in the public interest. 
 The definitions and characteristics of regulation above suggest that there are two 
problems with using private ordering as a regulatory model. The first is that it raises 
questions about whether the private ordering is legitimate in the sense that it satisfies 
the criteria of good regulation. The second and more crucial problem is whether it 
accounts for public interest concerns in e-payment services and systems. In the 
following sections, we highlight how new cybercrime threats have forced new 
regulations and the ways in which these create legitimacy problems. 
THE THREAT LANDSCAPE ± CYBERCRIME AND LIMITS OF BANKING AND 
FINACIAL GUIDELINES 
There is a profound irony at the heart of this debate. Fraud was already endemic in 
Nigeria, even before the widespread use of computer systems. However, it is widely 
acknowledged that the use of electronic systems acted as a great facilitator and made 
the so-FDOOHG ³´ RU ³DGYDQFH-IHH´ H-mail frauds remarkably successful.42 The 
SUROLIHUDWLRQ RI ³ VSDP´H[HPSOLILHV WKH LQWHUQHW-created opportunity. By offering 
global accessibility,
43
 the internet effectively enabled fraudsters to send spam e-mails; 
typically requesting assistance in transferring some illegally sourced funds to bank 
accounts abroad.
44
 Perhaps due to the limited infrastructure for electronic money 
transfers and the stigmatisation of the Nigerian political class as highly corrupt, many 
perceived these e-mails as credible and the e-mails were particularly successful with 
                                                          
41 ,GVHHDOVRIXUWKHUQRWHVEHORZDWS« 
42 $6PLWK³1LJHULDQ6FDP(-0DLOVDQGWKH&KDUPVRI&DSLWDO´Cultural Studies 
27. 
43 M ZoRN ³<RXU8UJHQW$VVLVWDQFH LV UHTXHVWHG7KH ,QWHUVHFWLRQRI6SDPDQG1HZ
1HWZRUNVRI,PDJLQDWLRQ´ Ethics, Place & Environment 65. 
44 -2ERKDQG<6FKRHQPDNHUV³1LJHULDQ$GYDQFH)HH)UDXGLQ7UDQVQDWLRQDO3HUVSHFWLYH´
(2010) 15 Policing Multiple Communities 235. 
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victims outside the country. The scale of the problem forced PayPal, the global 
payment service provider, to close all Nigerian accounts in 2005.
45
  
 In part because of existing cybercrime threats, government policies to 
promote e-payments in Nigeria were unsuccessful at first. However, in 2011, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) introduced the ³&DVKOHVV1LJHULD´SURMHFW. The project 
significantly improved the migration to e-payments primarily because it penalised cash 
transactions.
46 With the increasing adoption of e-payments, the threat for cybercrime 
changed significantly. Targets became more domestic, and schemes evolved to match 
the increasing online population.47 As the CBN admitted, fraud migrated to card-not-
present (CNP) transactions and other web-based payment applications.48 Due to the 
ubiquity of the internet and increasing payment mobility (Nigeria has about 60 million 
internet users), it is reasonable to assume that data breaches, identity theft, and fraud 
will be on the rise. Hence, the CBN has made a significant effort not only to increase 
DZDUHQHVVRIF\EHUFULPLQDOV¶WDFWLFVDQGKRZXVHUVRIH-payment services can avoid 
victimisation, but also to recommend increases in the resilience of the payment 
V\VWHPV¶ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG ZRUN-streams to encourage the use of e-payment 
systems.49  
 The CBN regulates e-payment services and transactions by issuing guidelines 
specific to different transactions. For example, Guidelines on Point of Sale (POS) Card 
Acceptance Services deal with card systems, mobile regulations deal with mobile 
payments and mobile moneys, and so on.50 The problem is not that there are different 
                                                          
45 See Countries and Regions Supported by PayPal available at: 
https://developer.paypal.com/docs/classic/api/country_codes/ (last accessed 26/03/2016). 
46 E.g. the CBN had directed Nigeria banks to charge processing fees on all cash transactions 
but none for e-SD\PHQWVVHH&%1OHWWHUWLWOHGµ,QGXVWU\3ROLF\RQ5HWDLO&DVK&ROOHFWLRQDQG
/RGJHPHQW¶,,73&&LUFXODU%36',5*(1&,5GDWHGWK0DUFh 2012. 
47 E.g. ATM fraud was the leading consumer complaint to the CBN between 2010 and 2012 
because of which the CBN directed the system to migrate from Chip and PIN to EMV cards. 
See Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Report and Statement of Account 2010, 
2011 and 2012 available at: http://ndic.org.ng/publications.html (last accessed 20/03/2016).  
48 Id. 
49 See Payments System Vision 2020 Release 2.0 (Central Bank of Nigeria, September 
2013). 
50 See generally Electronic Banking Regulations 2003; Revised Guidelines on Stored 
Value/Pre-Paid Card Issuance and Operation 2012; Standards and Guidelines on Automated 
Teller Machines (ATM) Operations in Nigeria 2010, and Regulatory Framework on Mobile 
Payment Services in Nigeria 2014; The Electronic Banking Regulations (e-banking 
regulations). 
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regulations but whether the regulations are applicable across the broad spectrum of 
e-payment services and providers. To illustrate, the Guidelines on POS stipulate that 
computer networks used to transmit financial data over the internet must meet the 
required standards specified for data confidentiality and integrity.
 
The precise 
standards specified by the regulations are that all payment service providers comply 
with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCIDSS), use as a minimum 
the 3DES encryption standard, and apply a minimum of two-factor authentication to 
verify user access to systems and services.51 The use of Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) is optional as the e-banking guidelines provide that banks may need to consider 
the use of PKI for authentication of users.
52
  
 Apart from the fact that Nigerian banks are affiliated with global card service 
providers, and are therefore obligated to comply with the PCIDSS by contractual 
agreements with relevant card networks, the CBN mandates compliance with the 
PCIDSS by providing in Item 3.1:   
All industry stakeholders who process and/or store cardholder information shall 
ensure that their terminals, applications and processing systems comply with the 
PLQLPXPUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKHIROORZLQJ>3&,'66@6WDQGDUGVDQG%HVW3UDFWLFHV«
In addition, all terminals, applications and processing systems should also comply 
with the standards specified by the various card schemes.
53  
The primary concern here is whether guidelines issued by the CBN will be accepted 
as generally binding by non-banks and non-financial institutions within the payment 
chain. The national electronic identity card clearly illustrates the problem. The e-
identity card is expected to offer PIN and fingerprint authentication, digital signature 
and payment functionalities, and it has been proposed that all Nigerians be issued a 
national identity number (NIN), which will be used for identification and account 
establishment purposes.
54
 The card is designed to serve as both an identity card and 
a bankcard. This suggests that although banks may be leading providers of e-payment 
services, non-banks and non-financial institutions, including the identity management 
authority, are now industry stakeholders who could potentially process and/or store 
                                                          
51 Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines 2011. 
52 Item 1.5.2 E-banking Guidelines (emphasis added).  
53 Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines. 
54 See Sections 27, 28, 29 Nigerian Identity Management Commission Act (NIMCA) 2007. 
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cardholder information. If we assume that unregulated access could compromise 
consumer data on the database of the Nigerian Identity Management Commission 
(NIMC), we begin to see how the adoption of technical security standards prescribed 
by the CBN could become problematic. Stated differently, although the POS guidelines 
cited above mention industry stakeholders, it must be presumed that these are 
stakeholders within the banking industry to which banking regulations apply and 
institutions like the NIMC may not consider themselves bound to implement 3DES 
encryption or apply two-factor authentication or even comply with the PCIDSS. The 
same argument applies to mobile network providers (MNOs), which are regarded as 
providers of infrastructure or platforms on which mobile payments may be initiated and 
completed, or mobile money stored.55    
 Although the above can raise questions of legitimacy in the sense that the 
CBN rules and standards are not generally accepted or recognised as binding, it could 
also implicitly suggest that the guidelines are inherently limiting. In the sections that 
follow, we analyse the limits of technical standards mandated by the CBN and the 
PCIDSS even within the banking and financial industry where they must apply. We 
also assess the constraints of the PCIDSS as a specific form of private ordering. Our 
analysis highlights areas where formal laws would produce better regulation. 
THE LIMITS OF TECHNICAL STANDARDS  
It was noted above that the CBN prescribes compliance with the PCIDSS, the use of 
3DES encryption standard, and a minimum of two-factor authentication, as well as the 
optional deployment of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In a sense, therefore, industry 
relies on technology to regulate e-payment services and systems. Although 
technology-based security systems are of immense importance to users because 
technology regulates behaviour without requiring users themselves to change their 
behaviour,56 there are constraints on technology and three clear areas that may inhibit 
efficient regulation in Nigeria. These are cost, the industry-centred character of 
technology application, and the fact that no security is completely impervious to 
threats.   
                                                          
55 See Revised Guidelines on Stored Value/Pre-Paid Card Issuance and Operation 2012. 
56 See further notes below at p 10. 
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Technology is Expensive  
The cost of implementing mandatory technologies, particularly the PCIDSS, affects 
the willingness of industry stakeholders to deploy them. For example, although all 
parties ² including acquirers, third-party processors and merchants, as well as all 
entities that store, process, or transmit cardholder data ² are expected to comply with 
the PCIDSS, the level of compliance in Nigeria is questionable.  
 According to one estimate, the cost of fully implementing the PCIDSS for a 
merchant in Nigeria is about $20,000 USD, which is considerably more than the total 
operating capital of an average merchant.
57
 Thereafter, the business needs an 
additional $1,000 per year for payment of software updates to electronic points of 
sale.
58
 Merchants must also bear the additional cost of periodic system vulnerability 
and compliance scans from third-party firms appointed by PCIDSS operators to ensure 
full and ongoing compliance. Arguably, this prohibitive cost can only be borne by the 
big players in the industry, such as banks and switching companies.
59
 Invariably, cost 
is a barrier to entry into e-payment services and may also lead to compromises in 
VHFXULW\VWDQGDUGV$VQRWHG LQ WKH3&,'66¶RZQJXLGHOLQHV WKHSURKLELWLYHFRVWRI
compliance invariably leads to compromises in consumer information such that 
businesses that are unable to encrypt data because of technical constraints or 
business limitations adopt compensating controls designed to mitigate associated 
risks.60 
 However, beyond identifying the likely impacts of the prohibitive cost of the 
PCIDSS, the payment industry has offered no viable solution. In fact, the possibility 
that service provider organisations will not deploy PCIDSS is heightened by the lax 
oversight. As an example, although the PCIDSS requirements are couched in 
mandatory terms, compliance is primarily determined through self-assessment. 
Additionally, while the Security Standards Council (SSC) sets the PCIDSS, it has no 
REOLJDWLRQWRYDOLGDWHRUHQIRUFHDQ\RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHVWDQGDUGVRU
                                                          
57 ) & 2ERGRH]H HW DO ³(QKDQFHG 0RGLILHG 6HFXULW\ )UDPHZRUN IRU 1LJHULD &DVKOHVV H-
SD\PHQW 6\VWHP´   International Journal of Computer and Science Applications 
189. 
58 Id. 
59 Id at 189±190. 
60 See Security Standards Council available at: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/ (last 
accessed 11/09/2015). 
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to impose penalties for non-compliance. Enforcement and penalties are governed by 
card brands and their partners, who may impose financial penalties or withdraw card 
acceptance services.61  Therefore, there is a lack of uniformity in the implementation 
of the standards because each card brand has different programs for compliance, 
validation, and enforcement.62   
 Whether these drawbacks indicate a need to re-evaluate the PCIDSS, we firmly 
argue in favour of the establishment of an independent legal authority to enforce the 
standards, on behalf of either the Council or the card brands.63 Alternatively and more 
efficiently, the law may set legal standards for securing card transactions and other e-
payment services. Indeed, with developing countries such as Nigeria, the failure to 
legislate the regulation of payment card transactions translates to governments 
effectively ceding consumer protection to private law-making by card associations and 
banks.64  
Technology is Industry Regulation - Misuse in Evidential Matters  
Another important aspect of regulation by technology is its near-total dependence on 
industry for implementation. Because of its highly technical nature, the deployment of 
technology is better understood by industry, and this may lead to discriminatory and 
even abusive use. Lessig noted that because of the self-executing and independent 
nature of technology (or code) regulation, the application of law or legal constraints in 
cyberspace is inherently limited.
65
 The most persuasive argument made, however, is 
that because code or technology can control better and more effectively than law, it 
may be misused ² particularly by the market. As such, code may not strike a proper 
balance or protect the various values prescribed by law and may become quite 
arbitrary in its application. In other words, technology is not always a positive regulator, 
and it does not always constrain in a manner that promotes the law. Wu makes this 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62 ($0RUVHDQG95DYDO ³3&,'663D\PHQW&DUG ,QGXVWU\'DWD6HFXULW\6WDQGDUGV LQ
Conte[W´Computer Law and Security Report 540 at 553. 
63 Id at 551. 
64 $65RVHQEHUJ³%HWWHU7KDQ&DVK"*OREDO3UROLIHUDWLRQRI'HELWDQG3UHSDLG&DUGVDQG
&RQVXPHU3URWHFWLRQ3ROLF\´Berkeley University Press (Bepress) Legal Series Paper 
766. 
65 Id at 127. 
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point more forcibly by asserting that code could be used as a mechanism of avoidance 
rather than protection.
66
  
 Although there have been no cases on this point in Nigeria, some cases in 
England demonstrate how abusive uses of technology by the financial and payment 
industry can undermine the judicial process and result in injustice.67 In Job v Halifax 
PLC,
68 the claim was for the sum of £2,100 (with interest), which the claimant argued 
had been wrongfully debited from his account with Halifax Bank through the fraudulent 
use of his debit card.  The bank admitted the debit but argued that it was justified 
EHFDXVH WKHPRQH\ZDVZLWKGUDZQ IURP WKHFODLPDQW¶VDFFRXQWXVLQJKLVFDUGDQG
correct PIN. However, in providing evidence, the bank declined to disclose card 
authentication keys because they were derived from a batch and would compromise 
other cards in issue. It was argued on behalf of the bank that key management 
procedures were commercially sensitive information, and an outside expert witness 
could not verify the authentication codes in the logs. However, the claimant argued 
WKDWWKHVHSLHFHVRIHYLGHQFHZHUHHVVHQWLDOWRWKHEDQN¶VFODLPWKDWWKHWUDQVDFWLRQV
occurred. They were also necessary to prove that the protocols were flawless and 
tamper-proof, and particularly that the bank maintained appropriate security controls 
related to key management. Notwithstanding the failure of the bank to produce the 
evidence, the claimant failed, and judgment was entered in favour of the bank. 
69  
 Similarly, in Rahman v Barclays Bank,
70
 the claimant sought reimbursement 
from his bank for money debited from his account because of the fraudulent use of his 
debit card by a third party. Without requiring the defendant/bank to provide strict proof, 
the court accepted its explanation that the fraud was committed because the claimant 
was negligent in that he gave the thief his card and other authenticating information. 
$OVRZLWKRXWSURRIWKHFRXUWDFFHSWHGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDVVHUWLRQVDERXWWKHVHFXULW\RI
                                                          
66 7:X³:KHQ&RGHLVQ¶W/DZ´Virginia Law Review 101 at 106. 
67 Cases from England are particularly relevant here because they constitute persuasive 
authorities in Nigerian courts as Nigeria was a former British colony and operates a common-
law system. 
68 &DVHQXPEHU%4$SULO LQ$.HOPDQ ³&DVH-XGJHPHQW(QJODQGDQG
:DOHV´Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 235.   
69 Id at 238. 
70 (Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court Case No 1YE003643 24 October 2012) in S Mason 
DQG 1 %RKP µ&RPPHQWDU\ RQ &DVH RQ $SSHDO (QJODQG DQG :DOHV¶   Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 175. 
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its authentication process and its electronic banking system. As the court itself 
REVHUYHG ³7KH EDQN GLG QRW SXW EHIRUH WKH FRXUW DQ\ GHWDLOHG HYLGHQFH DERXW WKH
security information it sought from the fraudster. It had no record of the transaction, 
VDYH LQJHQHUDO WHUPV´71 An important factor in this case is that the claimant might 
have prejudiced his case by his alleged untruthfulness regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the fraud. Nevertheless, when banks can succeed in defending claims by 
their customers without producing crucial evidence, there is a disincentive to retain 
such evidence and produce it when required. Conversely, if the law renders the 
production of such evidence mandatory, banks would have no choice but to retain the 
HYLGHQFH$V0DVRQDQG%RKPDUJXH ³,I WKHLU >WKHEDQN¶V@ defence fails for lack of 
relevant evidence, they will soon enough learn to make sure to retain and produce it. 
6RIWFDVHVPDNHEDGODZ´72 
 The aforementioned cases demonstrate how technology can serve as a shield 
and can also be used to manipulate legal and judicial processes. Such manipulations 
may lead to doubt as to whether justice was served in cases involving disputed 
transactions between banks and their customers. The provisions of the Nigerian 
Evidence Act give some indication that Nigerian courts may arrive at conclusions 
similar to Job and Rahman. The Evidence Act admits electronic signatures generally.
73  
6HFWLRQRIWKH$FWSURYLGHVWKDW³:KHUHDUXOHRIHYLGHQFHUHTXLUHVDVLJQDWXUH
or provides for certain consequences if a document is not signed, an electronic 
VLJQDWXUHVDWLVILHVWKDWUXOHRIODZRUDYRLGVWKRVHFRQVHTXHQFHV´+RZHYHUUHJDUGLQJ
the nature of e-signatures or the evidential weight or standard and burden of proof, the 
provisions of the law are quite vague. For example, SectioQSURYLGHVWKDW³$OO
electronic signatures may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a 
procedure existed by which it is necessary for a person, to proceed further with a 
transaction, to have executed a symbol or security procedure for verifying that an 
HOHFWURQLFUHFRUGLVWKDWRIWKHSHUVRQ´ 
 It is not clear whether the law is referring to the mere generation of an e-
signature or whether it incorporates the means of verifying the correctness of the 
procedure for creating the signature. For evidential purposes, the fact that a signature 
                                                          
71 Id at 185. 
72 Id at 187. 
73 See ss 93±97 Evidence Act (Nigeria) 2011. 
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exists is not terribly important. It is more important to be able to verify the signer and 
to ensure that correct security protocols were implemented in creating the signature. 
Therefore, the manner of proving a signature depends largely on the type of signature 
in question. To illustrate, in contrast to simple e-signatures, advanced e-signatures 
(often referred to as digital signatures) use a combination of a mathematical algorithm 
and a key system to create a unique digital fingerprint associated with a person or 
entity. Moreover, digital signatures are supported by public key infrastructure, or PKI, 
which enables third-party certification authorities to verify the authenticity of the signer. 
By logical assumption, therefore, a digital signature may be proved by reference to the 
protocols used to create the signature and the authority verifying its authenticity. 
However, because the law provides that a signature can be authenticated in any 
manner, regarding some symbols or procedures, this vagueness may allow banks and 
other service providers to make arguments like those in Job and Rahman cited above. 
Stated differently, a bank may simply have to prove that certain security protocols exist 
without also having to prove that such protocols were, in fact, applied or correctly 
implemented. It is arguable therefore, that the vagueness in the Evidence Act derives 
from the fact that Nigeria has no digital signature law. Digital signature laws often 
define different forms of e-signatures and delineate procedures for the creation and 
verification of the signatures and courts could routinely refer to such laws to determine 
the type of e-signature at issue, how it is created, and who bears the burden of proof, 
as well as the weight or evidential value to ascribe to the signature.
74  
6HFXULW\LVQHYHU³$EVROXWH´ 
Secured payments often depend on authenticating technologies. However, 
authenticators have different degrees of reliability. PINs, passwords, tokens, and 
access codes that are based on authentication protocols of what a person knows or 
has are susceptible to criminal attacks and can be forged or stolen by hackers and 
phishers. Additionally, encryption combined with stronger authentication technologies 
such as digital signatures is still susceptible to criminal attacks such as man-in-the-
middle (MiTM) unless PKI is fully deployed to minimise the risks.75  
                                                          
74 See e.g., Regulations on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic 
Transactions in the Internal Market Reg 910/2014/EU see in particular regs 3, 13, 25, 26 & 32. 
75 See S G Kanade, D Petrovska-Delacretaz and B Dorizzi Enhancing Information Security 
and Privacy by Combining Biometrics with Crypography (2012 Morgan and Claypool). 
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 In addressing the limits of technical security measures, it is pertinent to discuss 
biometrics, which are now WRXWHGDV WKH³VLOYHUEXOOHW´ LQFRPEDWWLQJ LGHQWLW\-related 
cybercrime in Nigeria. The CBN introduced the use of biometrics for accountholder 
verification in February 2014. Under the initiative, tagged biometric verification number 
(BVN), banks are requirHGWRUHJLVWHUWKHLUFXVWRPHUV¶ELRPHWULFLQIRUPDWLRQLQFOXGLQJ
their fingerprints and facial image. The objective of the BVN is to use biometrics for 
identification and authentication of account holders across the financial industry, 
thereby reducing cusWRPHUV¶H[SRVXUHWRLGHQWLW\WKHIWDQGIUDXG76However, while it is 
true that unlike PINs, passwords and tokens, biometrics are permanently linked to a 
person, it is also correct that biometric characteristics, whether biological or 
behavioural, carry the risk of false performance. That is, biometrics can generate false 
positives and false negatives. False negatives deny access to otherwise authentic 
users, while false positives grant access to fraudulent users, or impostors.
77
 
Fingerprint readers used during the Nigerian general elections sometimes failed to 
identify authentic voters, which highlights the problems associated with false 
negatives. In e-payment transactions, e-commerce, and e-banking, false negatives 
and false positives may have further implications for financial loss. False negatives 
may cause payment systems to decline otherwise authentic transactions, while false 
SRVLWLYHVPD\JUDQWIUDXGVWHUVDFFHVVWRYLFWLPV¶ILQDQFLDOLQIRUPDWLRQRUHYHQWRWKH
databases of organisations.  
 More crucially, because the nature of the threat to identity databases includes 
its very primacy as a target of hackers for identity theft, databases where biometric 
information is stored are prone to vulnerabilities and attacks. In the case of the BVN, 
the stakes are even higher, as a compromise to the database of any bank in Nigeria 
could potentially endanger biometric information stored by all banks in the country. For 
example, if legitimate user data is replaced with false data or stored biometric 
templates are deleted to facilitate re-enrolment, the same information is compromised 
across all payment institutions and chains because the unique biometric is identical on 
all systems. This susceptibility suggests the need for another law ² a data protection 
                                                          
76 See Bank Verification Number available at: http://www.bvn.com.ng/  (last accessed 
15/03/2016). 
77 $ ' 0HDGRZV ³6SRRI DQG 9XOQHUDELOLW\ RI %LRPHWULF 6\VWHPV´ LQ (OL]D <LQJL 'X HG
Biometrics from Fiction to Practice (2013 Pan Stanford Publishing) 188 at 195. 
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law that would set standards of protection for personal data collected and stored in 
proprietary databases.78  
THE PCIDSS AND MARKET CONSTRAINTS - INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND 
EXTERNALITIES  
Although industry standard-setting is a rule-making process and has a regulatory 
effect, we maintain that even if industry were willing, it would be unable to regulate e-
payment systems to prevent cybercrimes such as identity theft and fraud without the 
coercive force of law. Market economy considerations create inefficiencies that limit 
WKH HIIHFWV RI LQGXVWU\¶V LQLWLDWLYHV DQG GLVFRXUDJH LWV LQYHVWPHQW LQ WHFKQRORJLFDO
solutions.  
Market Systems and Asymmetric Information   
Information asymmetry exists in markets where information about goods and services 
is unilaterally known to one party. This may be the seller or the buyer. In any case, 
markets in which information asymmetry exists are characterised by low quality 
products and high prices because products cannot be distinguished by their 
characteristics. Where sellers hold exclusive information, for example, buyers are 
deprived of making informed decisions about price and quality. In other words, 
because information about quality is known only to the sellers, prices fail to signify 
quality to buyers, and sellers of low quality products can sell at prices comparative to 
high quality products. This information deficit has additional consequences. First, it 
drives the sellers of high quality products out of the market because they cannot 
increase the prices of their products because of buyer ignorance regarding quality. The 
second consequence is the proliferation of poor quality products in the marketplace, 
which leads to buyer withdrawal from the market and ultimately market failure.
79
 In 
financial and payment services terms, asymmetric information comes into play when 
                                                          
78 This would be a general or omnibus data protection law modelled after the EU data 
protection law. Although, a detailed discussion of the problems with the EU law is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is important to note that a proposal to adopt the EU approach does not 
also suggest that a Nigerian law on data protection replicate the exact provisions of the EU 
law particularly because of its broad and rather nebulous definition of personal data. 
79 6HHJHQHUDOO\*$NHUORI ³7KH0DUNHW IRU ³/HPRQV´4XDOLW\ Uncertainty and the Market 
0HFKDQLVP´The Quarterly Journal of Economics VHHDOVR6/6FKUHIW³5LVNV
RI ,GHQWLW\ WKHIW &DQ WKH 0DUNHW 3URWHFW WKH 3D\PHQW 6\VWHP"´  Fourth Quarterly 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 5. 
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providers of payment services promote or disclose the strong qualities of their 
products, such as efficiency, while withholding the negative features, such as weak 
security.
80
 
 Concerns about information asymmetry are particularly useful in assessing the 
risk of identity theft in e-payment systems. Since non-cash transactions involve the 
WUDQVIHURISHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKHFRQVXPHUWRWKHVHOOHUWKHVHOOHU¶VVWDQGDUG
of safeguarding information is material to the customHU¶VHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHULVNRIWKH
transaction. Where there is laxity, the cost of the product should be reduced to reflect 
the risk of misuse. That is, less secure products should sell for less, and more secure 
products should sell for more. However, because information asymmetry exists, this is 
not the case. Both secure and insecure products and services sell at relative prices. 
Providers of less secure products and services will not lower their prices because 
FRQVXPHUV¶DVVRFLDWHKLJKSULFHZLWKKLJKTXDlity, and sellers of more secure products 
are unable to attract customers desiring such products because of the lack of price 
differentials. Overall, sellers of better security products operate at a loss, while 
providers of less secure products are profitable. Nevertheless, because payment 
V\VWHPV¶LQWHJULW\DQGHIILFLHQF\DUHSXEOLFJRRGV81 ² in the sense that the market as 
a whole suffers the consequences of identity theft ² sellers with less security have no 
incentive to provide better security. In other words, if bad security precipitates data 
breaches and increased incidents of identity theft, consumers associate losses with 
the entire market, and may therefore migrate from e-payment systems causing market 
failure or total collapse.
82
  
This discussion can be placed in the context of the Nigerian financial market, which 
KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDV³DPDUNHWZKHUHIUDXGLQIRUPDWLRQLVNHSWWRSVHFUHW´83 This 
lack of transparency, which is characteristic of virtually all aspects of banking and 
financial transactions, includes information about conditions related to the use of 
                                                          
80 Id (Schreft) at 23. 
81 See definition of public goods above at note 39. 
82 Schreft above at note 79.  
83 Nigerian Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) Annual Report 2012 (Although, a copy of this 
report was obtained for the purpose of the research, further reference could be provided as it 
is unclear whether the report was subsequently published or otherwise made publicly 
available). 
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financial products, transaction costs, and so on. Recognizing the need to review of 
transparency practices in the financial market, the CBN noted:   
An important component of the review exercise was the development of a 
minimum disclosure requirement that stipulates the information banks are 
required to disclose to all customers prior to the consummation of every credit 
WUDQVDFWLRQ «7KH RYHUUHDFKLQJ JRDO « LV WR SURGXFH D *XLGH WKDW« ZLOO
accommodate the freedom of operators to charge competitive prices, while 
protecting consumers from arbitrary and excess charges.
84  
These observations imply that service charges in the financial industry are seldom 
reflective of value and may be arbitrary regardless of quality. Banking applications and 
implementation standards for EMV cards exemplify how asymmetric information works 
in e-payment systems. According to Murdoch and Anderson, not only does the security 
of banking apps vary across platforms and suppliers, but because most apps are 
proprietary, their vulnerabilities are known only to service providers. Additionally, while 
acknowledging the security of the EMV protocol, we argue that the protocol has 
numerous vulnerabilities, which are the inevitable result of implementation choices. 
Banks can choose, for example, to issue relatively inexpensive cards that use public 
key cryptography in the card authentication step or opt for cheaper cards that merely 
present a certificate signed by the issuing bank. These cheaper cards, which do not 
use PKI, are easier to clone.
85
  
 It is possible to argue that consumers may be completely unaware of banks and 
other payment service providers with lax security systems. Consequently, products, 
services, and charges are not comparatively and competitively priced. The CBN itself 
recognises the effects of asymmetric information on the financial market and has 
concluded that it invariably leads to distrust and market collapse. Per the CBN, 
³«FXVWRPHUVGRQRWSHUFHLYHIUDXGDs an issue with a specific bank, but with electronic 
                                                          
84 Letter from Central Bank of Nigeria to all deposit Money Banks Reference No 
CFP/DIR/GDL/01/018 dated 6th July 2012. 
85 S Mudorch DQG 5 $QGHUVRQ ³6HFXULW\ 3URWRFROV DQG (YLGHQFH :KHUH 0DQ\ 3D\PHQW
6\VWHPV)DLO´7KH3UH-proceeding Draft for Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data 
Security Barbados March 3-7 2014) available at: 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/fc14evidence.pdf (last accessed 22/03/2016). 
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payments overall, which eventually affects the entire industry and not just the 
LQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWKDYHEHHQLPSDFWHGE\IUDXG´86  
 It is important to note that as information asymmetry is invariably a part of 
traditional markets, this position is unlikely to change. Organisations expect to protect 
their brands and withhold adverse information from customers unless they are 
compelled by law. Therefore, it is the role of government to correct transactional 
imbalances and impose transparency rules through legislation.
87  
Market Systems and Negative Externalities  
Externalities operate to confer costs or benefits on entities other than those who should 
bear them. They can be positive or negative. Positive externalities confer benefits on 
those who cannot be charged for the benefits, while negative externalities confer costs 
on those who should not bear the cost. In markets where the externalities are negative, 
entities most often engage in activities that impose costs on others and less often in 
activities that benefit others.
88 In the context of e-payments, if the risks of weak 
security, data breaches, and identity theft and fraud are borne not by payment service 
providers but, rather, by individuals, society or other organisations, there is less 
incentive for organisations to provide better security and therefore prevent the 
proliferation of negative externalities.
89
 Two activities in the Nigerian payment industry 
demonstrate how externalities operate to displace the cost of fraud.  First, the liability 
allocation regime already places the burden of fraud on the consumer or user. Second, 
through law enforcement, society appears to have assumed the cost of preventing 
fraud on e-payment platforms, thus providing further disincentive to industry.  
 (a) How Unclear Rules about Liability Allocation Promote the Operation of 
Externalities - 
The transaction alert system introduced by banks in Nigeria is a good example of how 
unclear policies promote externalities. Under the system, card or account holders 
receive alerts or notifications immediately when a transaction occurs on their accounts 
                                                          
86 &HQWUDO %DQN RI 1LJHULD ³$ERXW WKH 1LJHULDQ (OHFWURQLF )UDXG )RUXP´ DYDLODEOH DW
<http://www.cenbank.org/neff/about.asp> (last accessed 09/04/2015). 
87 See e.g., Payment Services Regulations (PSR) 2009 SI 2009/209 (UK) Part 5. 
88 See R Cornes and T Sandler The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods 
(1986 CUP).  
89 Schreft above note 78 at 5. 
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or payment cards. The effect is to instantly alert the card or account holder to fraudulent 
transactions and forestall further fraud. Customers who receive notifications of 
unauthorised transactions are expected to immediately notify the service provider, 
ZKLFK WKHQ ³EORFNV´ WKH DFFRXQW RU FDUG WR SUHYHQW IXUWKHU XVH E\ WKH IUDXGVWHU
Invariably, because it allows at least one fraudulent transaction even if it prevents 
RWKHUVWKHV\VWHPDPRXQWVWR³EROWLQJWKHEDUQDIWHUWKHKRUVHKDVHVFDSHG´0RUH
importantly, bank customers may still be liable for losses that occur before the 
transaction alert, as even if a transaction is fraudulent, the customer is not assured to 
be reimbursed or indemnified for the loss, nor does the bank guarantee that it would 
even investigate the loss.  
 This practice is correct since the regulatory framework allows parties the 
flexibility to determine where fraud liability falls. Under the e-banking guidelines, 
³DJUHHPHQWV UHDFKHG EHWZHHQ SURYLGHUV DQG XVHUV RI H-banking products and 
services should clearly state the responsibilities and liabilities of all parties involved in 
WKH WUDQVDFWLRQV´90 The guidelines fail to provide any meaningful guidance on the 
allocation of liabilities and offers little, if any, protection for users of electronic banking 
and payment systems. It is arguable, for instance, that while contracts constitute 
important evidence of an agreement between parties, contracts envisaged by the 
guidelines will usually be standard form contracts containing extensive exemption of 
liability clauses. Information asymmetry suggests that the respective bargaining 
SRZHUVRIWKHSDUWLHVDUHOLNHO\WREHXQHTXDOEHFDXVHRIVHUYLFHSURYLGHUV¶VXSHULRU
knowledge about product functionalities and security defects. Ultimately, however, if 
consumers bear their own losses, providers of e-payment services such as banks can 
externalise the cost of fraud.   
 Perhaps in recognition of the inefficiency (and even unfairness) of the existing 
liability allocation structure, the CBN proposed a card arbitration framework called the 
E-payment Dispute Arbitration Framework.  The objectives of the framework 
include provisions of speedy redress for e-payment disputes without involving the 
courts. The framework is also intended to facilitate the identification of the entity at fault 
in disputed claims and to shift liability toward that entity.
91
 Again, however, apart from 
                                                          
90 Item 3.0(g) CBN Guidelines on Electronic Banking 2003.  
91 Item 3 Central Bank of Nigeria (Proposed) E-payment Dispute Arbitration Framework 2013 
available at: https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2013/ccd/e-
payment%20dispute%20arbitration%20framework.pdf (last accessed 23/04/2016). 
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the fact that the framework has yet to become operable, some of its provisions already 
suggest that it would be equally problematic and is unlikely to have much effect on the 
VWDWXVTXR)RUH[DPSOH,WHPGRIWKHIUDPHZRUNSURYLGHVWKDW³where a Cardholder 
uses an EMV Payment Card on an EMV Terminal and fraud occurs, liability is on the 
Cardholder. However, it is the responsibility of the issuer to prove to the arbitration 
panel that the Payment Card issued was the Payment Card used and the Payment 
&DUGZDVQRWUHSRUWHGVWROHQ´ 
 Based upon their literal construction, the above provisions already carry a 
presumption that the cardholder is liable without requiring that evidence on the state 
RI WKH VHFXULW\ RI WKH VHUYLFH SURYLGHU¶V V\VWHPV EH SURGXFHG &RQWUDU\ WR WKH
arguments demonstrating that EMV cards can be compromised, especially when 
issuers influence the security design, the provisions appear to suggest that the cards 
are completely impregnable. Some provisions of the Payment Services Regulations 
(PSR) (UK) help to highlight the point here. Section 60(3) PSR provides as follows:  
Where a payment service user denies having authorised an executed payment 
transaction, the use of a payment instrument recorded by the payment service 
provider is not in itself necessarily sufficient to prove either that ² 
 (a) the payment transaction was authorised by the payer; or 
 (b) the payer acted fraudulently or failed with intent or gross negligence to 
comply with   regulation 57.  
Regulation 57 addresses the obligations of the payer/user to provide notification to the 
service provider of theft, misappropriation, or unauthorised use of the payment 
instrument in the agreed manner without undue delay upon becoming aware of the 
fact.92 The cumulative effect of regulations 57(2) and 60(3) is to displace the 
SUHVXPSWLRQRIQHJOLJHQFHDQGFROOXVLRQZKLFKRIWHQIROORZVDFRQVXPHU¶VDOOHJDWLRQ
of unauthorised use of a payment instrument. The payment service provider is required 
to provide strict proof, even when it appears that the actual payment instrument issued 
has been used, to authorise a disputed transaction.  
 Unlike the proposed Card Arbitration Framework, the PSR places the burden of 
proving a disputed payment on the service provider and negates presumptions of 
                                                          
92 Payment Systems Regulations (PSR) above note 86 regs 60(3) & 57(2). 
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negligence and fraud on the part of the user.
93
 Therefore, since it merely promotes the 
presumption of negligence or collusion on the part of the cardholder, the proposed 
card arbitration framework in Nigeria may produce results such as those of Job and 
Rahman cited earlier. As Mason rightly contends, such resulting decisions would be 
³LQFRUUHFWGHFLVLRQVEDVHGRQDPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHEXUGHQRISURRIDIDLOXUH to 
SURSHUO\WHVWWKHHYLGHQFHDQGDQDFFHSWDQFHRIXQZDUUDQWHGDVVXPSWLRQV´94  
 (b) 6RFLHW\¶V$VVXPSWLRQRIWKH&RVWRI)UDXGDVDQ([WHUQDOLW\   
An example of how society bears the cost of fraud in Nigeria is evident by efforts of 
law enforcement agents aimed at combatting cybercrime. Although Nigeria only 
recently passed a cybercrime law,
95
 law enforcement agents appear to have previously 
developed a typology of cybercriminals. The typology characterises cybercriminals as 
male, between the ages of 18 and 33, typically well-educated (in the Nigerian context 
this means the person has up to university-level education), unemployed and 
technology savvy.96 To justify their classification in any of the categories, suspected 
cybercriminals will also usually be in possession of laptop computers or smartphones 
with the ability to initiate connectivity to the internet almost 24 hours of the day.97 Such 
³VXVSHFWV´PD\EHFODVVLILHGDV³<DKRR<DKRR%R\V´QDPHGDIWHUWKHVHDUFKHQJLQH
<DKRRRU³QHUV´QDPHGDIWHUWhe section of the Nigeria criminal code criminalising 
impersonation). They may also be classified as engaged in a new form of electronic 
SD\PHQWIUDXGFDOOHG³FDVKOHVV/DJRV´LQPLPLFU\RIWKHFDVKOHVVSROLF\RIWKH&%1
Classifying a person as a cybercriminal is often accompanied by indiscriminate 
searches of such persons, or of their properties or premises.  
 Although indiscriminate searches clearly infringe on certain fundamental 
human rights,98 the more pressing question is how law enforcement activities operate 
to externalise the cost of fraud. On the one hand, such activity is wasteful if not futile, 
                                                          
93 Id regs 60(1)-(3). 
94 S MasoQ ³(OHFWURQLF %DQNLQJ DQG +RZ &RXUWV $SSURDFK WKH (YLGHQFH´  
Computer Law and Security Review 144. 
95 See Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention etc.) Act 2015. 
96 This prototype was given by Law Enforcement agents and forms part of the data used by 
one of the authors in a broader research into the challenges of implementing cybersecurity in 
Nigeria.  
97 Id. 
98 For example, rights to privacy and freedom from discrimination, harassment and 
intimidation are guaranteed under s 28(1) (a)-(h) Ch IV Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 (as amended).  
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EHFDXVHSULRUWR1LJHULDKDGQRF\EHUFULPHODZXQGHUZKLFK³VXVSHFWV´FRXOG
be prosecuted and convicted. Yet society pays for the time and the resources 
expended conducting searches and on investigations of arguably non-prosecutable 
crimes. On the other hand, because the activities raise the presumption that 
cybercrime is being controlled, whether deliberately or inadvertently, service providers 
may fail to consider all the costs and benefits of their actions or inactions to other 
parties. In other words, providers may under-invest in security on the basis that 
cybercrime is being addressed or that its challenges are only marginal. To ensure that 
service providers continue to invest in up-to-date security, the law must set minimum 
security standards below which providers must not fall.  
PRIVATE ORDERING AND THE INDEX FOR STRONG REGULATION      
We argued that private ordering must meet the index of strong regulation identified as 
legitimacy, accountability, due process, expertise, and efficiency. The establishment 
of the Nigerian Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) is a telling illustration of the inefficiency 
of legislative mandate. The NeFF is an all-stakeholder fraud forum established to 
monitor electronic fraud and encourage fraud reporting, information dissemination, 
DQGLQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJDPRQJVWDNHKROGHUV$VVWDWHGLQWKH1H))¶VDQQXDOUHWXUQV
WKHIRUXPZDVERUQRXWRIWKHQHHGIRU³DKROLVWLFDSSURDFK to combat the menace of 
fraud and restore confidence in all e-SD\PHQW PHFKDQLVPV LQ WKH FRXQWU\´99 The 
rationale for establishing the body include recognizing that electronic fraud attempts 
will increase significantly as Nigeria migrates to electronic payments, and the fact that 
e-fraud incidences are negatively impacting the entire financial industry. The NeFF is 
mandated to form cohesive and effective fraud risk management practices through 
information and knowledge sharing with key industry stakeholders. The NeFF, in 
conjunction with the CBN and the Nigeria Interbank Settlement Systems (NIBSS), has 
also developed a dedicated portal for fraud reporting in the e-payment industry.100 
The establishment of the NeFF is therefore based on the overall assumption that 
                                                          
99 NeFF Annual Report above at note 82. 
100 6HH&HQWUDO%DQNRI1LJHULD³6XEPLVVLRQRI)UDXG5HSRUWRQ(-channels using A Common 3RUWDOIRUWKH3D\PHQW,QGXVWU\´&%1FLUFXODUBPS/DIR/CIR/GEN/02/103 of 02 July 2013). 
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cybercrime control will be more effective if payment institutions share fraud information 
and articulate a common requirement to law enforcement agents.101 
 However, while the NeFF is innovative in promoting collaboration, some of its 
objectives underscore existing inefficiencies and overall failures on the part of financial 
regulators. First, because the NeFF is projected as an alternative forum for fraud 
reporting, it is indicative of the failure of primary fraud reporting systems. It therefore 
impairs WKH UHJXODWRUV¶ H[HFXWLRQ RI WKHLU UHJXODWRU\ PDQGDWH DQG DPRXQWV WR
reinventing the wheel. Second, and consequential to the first reason, the effectiveness 
of NeFF is questionable because it is likely to be perceived merely as a regulatory 
watchdog. For instance, if organisations will not report fraud to the CBN as a regulator, 
why would they exchange fraud information with the NeFF, which is an initiative of the 
CBN and a convergence of competitors, regulators, and law enforcement? In essence, 
it is reasonable to expect that fraud information disclosed at the forum will eventually 
be passed on to regulators, with possible regulatory reprisals. This would inhibit the 
free dissemination of fraud information, which is the primary objective of the NeFF. 
From this perspective, the NeFF may invariably represent a classic example of the 
IDLOXUHRIOHJLVODWLYHPDQGDWH7KDWLVWKH1H))LVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKHIDLOXUHRIWKH&%1¶V
legislative mandate to protect e-payment systems.  
 Furthermore, although regulatory guidelines provide that there must be regular 
and ongoing assessment of compliance with the PCIDSS, there are no fully functional 
monitoring processes in place in Nigeria. For example, the e-banking guidelines 
SURYLGH WKDW ³HDFK YHQGRUPXVW SURYLGH YDOLG FHUtificates showing compliance with 
these standards, and must regularly review the status of all its terminals to ensure they 
are still compliant as standards change. [And] there will be a continuous review and 
recertification on compliance with these and other global industry standards from time 
WRWLPH´102 In contrast to this requirement, organisations are only subject to an initial 
inspection to determine whether they meet the compliance threshold (for which they 
receive a certificate). Thereafter, there is no framework to ensure that organisational 
practices are upgraded.103 This invariably promotes the argument that existing 
                                                          
101 6HH JHQHUDOO\ &HQWUDO %DQN RI 1LJHULD ³$ERXW WKH 1LJHULDQ (OHFWURQLF )UDXG )RUXP´
available at: http://www.cenbank.org/neff/about.asp (last accessed 09/04/2015). 
102 Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines. 
103 E.g. statistics are disputed on the levels of compliance with the PCIDSS. As at 2011, only 
two of the potential target organisations were reported to be PCIDSS compliant. Contested 
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private ordering lacks accountability, fails to comply with due process, and that the 
PCIDSS itself is largely ineffective.104 
 It therefore appears that if we apply the index of measuring strong regulation, 
industry expertise will be the only strength of regulation by the e-payment industry in 
Nigeria. However, it has been previously argued that industry can manipulate its 
technological expertise to serve its own purposes. As such, industry may need to be 
regulated even in terms of how it applies this expertise. The concluding section of this 
paper charts the way forward. The analysis justifies the interplay between different 
regulatory mechanisms and explicates the overall role of law in the regulatory schema.  
HOW LAW REGULATES - /(66,*¶6 02'$/,7,(6 OF REGULATION IN 
CYBERSPACE AND THE REGULATION OF E-PAYMENTS  
Perhaps because there is much debate about the regulation of the internet itself, 
governments have been sceptical about the best approach to regulate the activities it 
mediates or facilitates. For example, it has been argued that to facilitate internet 
growth, and ensure the protection of fundamental rights, government intervention and 
formal rules are both unwarranted and unwanted.105 However, it has also been 
argued that an unfettered internet is not an automatic guarantor of human rights and 
there is a need to regulate self-evolving rules and the institutions that administer 
them.106 Although the latter argument is correct in that it justifies the need for law, 
much of the argument in this area fails to identify how law would operate in the complex 
cyberspace environment.107 Lessig addresses this gap by proposing that legal and 
policy solutions to the regulatory dilemma in cyberspace are found in the interplay 
between different regulatory modalities.  
                                                          
reports also put the level of compliance at 2% in 2012 and up to 50% in 2013, however there 
are no reports ongoing compliance checks or the present state of PCIDSS compliance in 
Nigeria.  
104 Morse and Raval above note 61 at 551. 
105 6HHHJ'5-RKQVRQDQG'3RVW³/DZDQG%RUGHUV-7KH5LVHRI/DZLQ&\EHUVSDFH´
(1996) 48 STAN L REV VHHDOVR-RKQ3HUU\%DUORZ³$'HFODUDWLRQRIWKH
,QGHSHQGHQFHRI&\EHUVSDFH´DYDLODEOHDWKWWSVSURMHFWVHIIRUJaEDUORZ'HFODUDWLRQ-
Final.html (last accessed 2/06/2014). 
106 6HHHJ-/*ROGVPLWK³$JDLQVW&\EHUDQDUFK\´The University of Chicago 
Law Review  VHH DOVR 7 :X ³&\EHUVSDFH 6RYHUHLJQW\" ± The internet and the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO6\VWHP´Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 647. 
107 Id (Goldsmith) at 1201. 
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 /HVVLJLGHQWLILHVIRXUPRGDOLWLHVRIUHJXODWLRQRU³WKLQJVWKDWUHJXODWH´108 These 
are law, architecture, norms, and the market. These modalities, as constraints to 
behaviour in real space, are transposable to cyberspace.  According to Lessig, law 
constraints objectively because it provides a set of commands and threatens 
punishment for disobedience. As in real space, the constraints of law in cyberspace 
include the threat of sanctions for violations of certain rights or punishment for certain 
behaviours.
109
 Social norms also limit, although in a manner that differs from the 
constraints of law. The theory is that members of a community impose normative 
constraints through slight and sometimes forceful sanctions rather than centralised 
action of the state.
110 As the third modality of regulation, the market constrains through 
differential pricing. This is based on the fact that prices signal the point at which a 
resource can be transferred from one person to another.
111
 The fourth, and perhaps 
most important modality of regulation, is the architecture of an environment, which 
encompasses the way things are or the way they are made or built.
112
 In the context 
of regulation, architecture can either enable or limit interaction with the environment, 
but ² unlike the other three constraining modalities ² architecture is independent of 
direct human imposition and is often automatically deployed or self-executing.
113
 
Therefore, code constrains without subjectivity and operates regardless of whether the 
party being constrained is aware of it.
114
 To this extent, code has regulatory potential 
DQDORJRXV WR UHJXODWLRQ E\ ODZ DQG LQGLUHFWO\ RU PHWDSKRULFDOO\ ³FRGH LV ODZ´115 
However, as an overriding regulatory modality, law can modify, alter, or enforce the 
code of cyberspace in a way that promotes the demands of commerce, society, policy, 
and justice.
116
  
 /HVVLJ¶VWKHRU\FRPSHOVWKHLQIHUHQFHWKDWDOWKRXJKLQGLYLGXDOO\WKHPRGDOLWLHV
of norm, market, and technology do work but whether they are effective would depend 
                                                          
108 L Lessig Code Version 2.0 (2nd ed., 2006, Basic Books) at 120. 
109  Id at 123±125. 
110 Id at 340±341. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Id at 342. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Id at 341. 
115 Id at 5. 
116 //HVVLJ³7KH/DZRIWKH+RUVH:KDW&\EHUODZ0LJKW7HDFK´Harvard Law 
Review 501 at 514. 
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RQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKH\DUHUHJXODWHGE\ODZ)RUH[DPSOHDVWKH³PRVWREYLRXV
self-FRQVFLRXVDJHQWRIUHJXODWLRQ´117 law will affect the other modalities in a manner 
that aids their roles as tools for legal regulation.118 In the analysis that follows, we 
UHIRUPXODWHDQGV\QWKHVLVH/HVVLJ¶VIRXUPRGDOLWLHVto propose a workable regulatory 
agenda for e-payment systems and to underline the primary role of formal rules.  
Regulating with Law, industry, Technology and Users  
Based on our earlier analysis, we can argue that only two of the modalities ² 
technology and market ² are presently represented in the regulatory arrangement for 
e-payment systems.119 However, we have argued that technology (or code) can be 
manipulated and market systems are self-serving in the sense that they allow industry 
(or the market) to pursue its own goals, and therefore promote the primacy of sector 
interests.120 We suggested that the public interests at stake include the prevention of 
crimes and correction of market failures as well as certainty and transparency in the 
administration of justice. Thus, our proposal is to include two additional modalities of 
ODZDQG³XVHUV´LQWKHUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUN 
 We opt to include users as our fourth modality not only because the lines of 
social norms are often ill-defined but also because it is difficult to develop an agenda 
IRUDQHQIRUFHDEOHQRUP)RUH[DPSOH/HVVLJ¶VSURSRVDORIUHJXODWLRQE\QRUPVZRXOG
beg the question of how generally acceptable norms will develop in the first place. This 
is particularly so as the cultural specificity of norms and the relativity of individual 
choice, as well the fluidity and mobility on the internet negate the permanence of 
engagements needed to sustain the development of generally acceptable norms. The 
idea of a global norm would therefore often be unattractive, as billions of people using 
the internet would not agree on regulatory norms.121 Notably, beyond proposing that 
³QRUPVFRXOGEHXVHGWRUHVSRQGWR>WKH@WKUHDWV«1RUPV² among commercial entities, 
for example ² may help build trust around certain privacy-SURWHFWLYHSUDFWLFHV´122 even 
Lessig was unable to provide clues as to how such normative frameworks would 
                                                          
117 Id at 511. 
118 Id at 502. 
119 See previous arguments at p 9-19. 
120 2XU XVH RI µWHFKQRORJ\¶ DQG µLQGXVWU\¶ LV IRU FRQVLVWHQF\ DV WKH\ HVVHQWLDOO\ DOLJQ ZLWK
/HVVLJ¶VFRQFHSWRIFRGHDQGPDUNHW 
121 J Goldsmith and T Wu Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless World (2006 
OUP) at 152. 
122 Lessig above note 107 at 223. 
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develop.123 5DWKHUKHFRQFHGHVWKDW³KRZSHRSOHZKRQHHGQHYHUPHHWFDQHVWDEOLVK
and enforce a rich set of social norms is a question that will push the theories of social 
QRUPGHYHORSPHQWIDU´124 Furthermore, because the effectiveness of norms depends 
largely on voluntary compliance, norms are analogous to the private ordering system 
and give rise to the same problems. Therefore, it would be correct to assert that the 
threat of enforcement is still necessary to cause people to conform to norms, and state 
enforcement is more certain and more secure than private efforts to coerce behaviour 
because the state can utilise its monopoly on official use of force.125   
 $VDQDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKHFRQWHVWHGQRWLRQRIFROOHFWLYHQRUP³8VHUV´LVDPRUH
specific term, which underscores the fact that the problem surrounds a group of people 
more likely to make individual rather than collective decisions. In the context of e-
payment systems, it addresses the ability or inability of respective users to articulate 
their choices in view of the payment instruments, processes, and providers they select. 
Additionally, because of their susceptibilities to social engineering, users are invariably 
part of the problem. Humans, unlike technology, can demonstrate extreme levels of 
variation in skill and do not always follow logical rules in conduct. They can be 
emotional actors, inevitably partial, driven by perception and emotion as much as by 
objective reality.126 Indeed, users are considered the weakest link in the security chain. 
7KH 9HUL]RQ GDWD EUHDFK UHSRUW QRWHG WKDW KXPDQV DUH WKH ³WKH FDUERQ OD\HU´ RI
information assets and are therefore notoriously susceptible to social tactics, including 
deception, manipulation, and intimidation. Therefore, as the report concludes, while 
humans are the most complex creatures on earth, savvy threat agents or criminals 
have consistently outwitted them or otherwise leveraged them to steal data.127 Since 
users are invariably part of the problem, we propose to make them a part of the 
VROXWLRQ0XUUD\¶VREVHUYDWLRQVWKDWXVHUVDUHQRWWREHFRQVLGHUHGSDVVLYHUHFLSLHQWV
                                                          
123 ,Gµ7KH=RQHVRI&\EHUVSDFH´Stanford Law Review 1403 at 1407. 
124 Id. 
125 See R D Cooter, ³/DZIURP2UGHU´ in J Mancur Olson & S Kahkoneh (eds.) A Not-So-Dismal 
Science: Broader Brighter Approach to Economies and Societies cited in Jonathan R Macy, 
³3XEOLFDQG3ULYDWH2UGHULQJDQGWKH3URGXFWLRQRI/HJLWLPDWHDQG,OOHJLWLPDWH5XOHV´
5/82 1123 at 1133. 
126 A M Matwyshyn (ed.) Harbouring Data: Information Security, Law, and the Corporation 
(2009, Stanford University Press) 229. 
127 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report 2012 at 33 available at: 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-
2012-ebk_en_xg.pdf (last accessed 23/02/2016). 
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of regulatory initiatives support this point.128 Again however, like technology and 
market, users would only operate effectively if law intervenes and sets certain 
standards. 
 Scepticism regarding the ability of users to protect themselves ranges from the 
complexity of technical security to ignorance or lack of awareness. To illustrate, while 
certificate-based authentication may help users to verify an entity by linking its public 
and private keys, it is debatable whether lay users can understand why the 
authentication protocol is necessary or what to look for, such as the security padlock, 
or even how to check certificates. In Nigeria, three further reasons account for why 
users cannot regulate themselves or prevent cybercrime. The first is the proliferation 
of pirated and unlicensed software. In 2011, a global piracy study put the rate of PC 
software piracy in Nigeria at 82 percent, which is almost double the global piracy rate. 
The same report put the rate of unlicensed software installations at 81 percent in 
2013.129 Since the links between cybersecurity and pirated software are well 
documented, it is safe to assume that if the Nigerian market is saturated with pirated 
software, most end-user products, including anti-virus programs, would also be 
GHIHFWLYH DQG XQUHOLDEOH 7KH VHFRQG UHDVRQ WKDW FDVWV GRXEWV RQ XVHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR
regulate without laws is the volatile threat landscape for e-payments. In other words, 
cybercrime remains a challenge because the threat landscape is evolving, and it is 
unlikely that providers and users can keep up with criminal tactics. To illustrate, since 
mobile devices are increasingly used for banking and payments, criminals are bound 
to migrate from computers and e-mails to mobile platforms to leverage attacks. In this 
case, user education serves a limited purpose and may have no effect at all on the 
rate of victimisation.  
 The third, and perhaps most important, reason is that technology is now being 
developed in Nigeria to address user volatility and unpredictability in the regulatory 
environment. Therefore, users are more likely to be regulated by technologies 
embedded into payment processes, services, and instruments rather than their own 
choices. This approach is not particularly complex, but it is controversial. Some 
                                                          
128 A D Murray The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment (2007 
Routledge Cavendish) at 51. 
129 6HH %6$ ³7KH &RPSOLDQFH *DS %6$ *OREDO 6RIWZDUH 6XUYH\ ´ DYDLODEOH DW
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2013/downloads/studies/2013GlobalSurvey_Study_en.pdf (last 
accessed 20/02/2016).  
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technologies described as having lock-in effects exemplify the potential problems 
therein. Lock-in technologies modify or alter the behaviour of actors in ways that 
ensure compliance with law or regulation or with industry standards for protecting 
privacy and security. Built-in security processes embedded in privacy by design (PbD) 
and privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) serve as good examples. PbD processes 
embed privacy features into design specification, implementation, and networked 
infrastructures from the outset. This entails built-in privacy requirements from the onset 
RIDV\VWHPV¶GHYHORSPHQWDQG throughout its life cycle.130  
 Consistent with this approach, and with the notion that technology is self-
executing when it comes to constraining human behaviour, the CBN introduced a 
biometric verification number (BVN) into the Nigerian banking industry. The features 
of the BVN have been discussed earlier, however, its implications for regulating users 
is significant. Although it is not entirely clear how the BVN will work, the presumption 
is that enrolment of individual biometrics would ensure that users are unable to access 
their accounts unless they are physically present at the point of sale. The BVN system 
therefore has the potential to create a lock-in effect because it employs technology to 
E\SDVV FHUWDLQ XVHU EHKDYLRXUV VXFK DV WKH DELOLW\ WR VKDUH RQH¶V 3,1 ZLWK RWKHU
people. HRZHYHUSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHRI WKHLUFDSDFLW\ WRFRPSHOREHGLHQFH ³ORFN-in 
WHFKQRORJLHV´DUHFRQWURYHUVLDO7KH\UDLVHTXHVWLRQVDERXWOHJLWLPDF\DQGFKRLFHDV
well as legal regulation that are fundamental to user role in regulation and fraud 
prevention in e-payment systems.  
Beyond Private Ordering - Legitimacy, Accountability and Due Process 
Lock-in technologies also referred to DV ³WHFKQR-UHJXODWLRQ´131 are defined as the 
deliberate employment of technology to regulate human behaviour.
132
 Jaap-koops 
characteULVHVWKHPPRUHDSWO\DV³WHFKQRORJ\ZLWKLQWHQWLRQDOO\EXLOW-in mechanisms to 
                                                          
130 $ &DYRXNLDQ ³3ULYDF\ E\ 'HVLJQ 7KH  )RXQGDWLRQDO 3ULQFLSOHV´  available at: 
https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf. (last accessed 
09/01/2016). 
131 6HH5%URZQVZRUG³&RGH&RQWURODQG&KRLFH:K\(DVWLV(DVWDQG:HVWLV:HVW´
25/1 Legal Studies 1 at 3-21 
132 5/HHQHV³)UDPLQJ7HFKQR-Regulation: An Exploration of State and Non-state Regulation 
E\7HFKQRORJ\´6HULHV1RTilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
149. 
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LQIOXHQFH SHRSOH¶V EHKDYLRXU´133 Perhaps significantly in his analysis of techno-
regulation, Brownsword argues that there are moral and ethical implications of design-
based technologies aimed at controlling harm-generating behaviour and technologies 
when they function in ways that override human choice, free will, and dignity. Such a 
view allows for little controversy when arguing that human dignity implies that people 
should be able to choose not only right actions, but also wrong ones. Accordingly, 
because design-based technologies impose behavioural constraints on their subjects, 
they deprive such subjects of the opportunity to choose between right and wrong.
134
  
 Although a distinction may be made between design-based technologies that 
RSHUDWHGLUHFWO\RQLQGLYLGXDOV¶GHFLVLRQ-making process and those that seek to restrict 
the exercise of individual judgement without overriding their judgement altogether, 
there are legitimate concerns that the technologies may generally jeopardise 
constitutional values. For example, they may lead to a loss of opportunity to appeal to 
the discretion and judgement of enforcement officials against the inappropriate or 
unfair application of regulatory standards.135 Certainly, design-based technologies 
raise these concerns even when they are incorporated to enforce legal norms. Jaap-
koops indicated that if technology's only use is to enforce prevailing legal norms, its 
DFFHSWDELOLW\ VKRXOG EH FDOOHG LQWR TXHVWLRQ VLQFH WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI ³RXJKW´ RU
³RXJKW QRW´ WR ³FDQ´ RU ³FDQQRW´ WKUHDWHQV RXU KXPDQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI QRUPV that 
represent bedrock elements of law in practice.
136  
 The above arguments would be correct to the extent that they identify the 
corrosive effects of design-based technologies on legitimacy and accountability. 
However, if the arguments intend to suggest that lock-in technologies reduce users to 
robotic recipieQWV RI LQGXVWU\¶V LQYHQWLRQV WKH\ ZRXOG EH LQFRUUHFW 7R VXSSRUW WKLV
point, it is important to note that progressive technological modifications have been 
used to respond to user problems in payment systems. As an example, by design, 
mere possession authenticates the use of credit cards, but this also creates incentive 
                                                          
133 Bert Jaap-NRRSV³&ULWHULDIRU1RUPDWLYH7HFKQRORJ\7KH$FFHSWDELOLW\RIµ&RGHDV/DZ¶LQ
WKH /LJKW RI 'HPRFUDWLF DQG &RQVWLWXWLRQDO 9DOXHV´ LQ 5 %URZQVZRUG 	 . <HXQJ
(eds.) Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological 
Fixes (2008 Oxford: Hart) at 158. 
134 Brownsword above note 130 at 15±17. 
135 . <HXQJ ³7RZDUGV DQ 8QGHUVWDQGLQJ RI 5HJXODWLRQ E\ 'HVLJQ´ LQ 5 %URZQVZRUG 	 .
Yeungabove note 132 at 79±107 
136 B Jaap-koops above note 13 at 159. 
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to steal the card, as any holder may use it. To correct this, subsequent ATM cards 
were designed with a required PIN. This means that the user must not only have the 
card but must also know the PIN. There is less incentive to steal this card unless the 
thief has access to the PIN. However, the technology also proved susceptible because 
users wrote PINs on their cards or kept them with the cards. To further increase 
confidence that the holder of the card is the authorised user, biometric technologies 
such as fingerprints, retinal scans, etc., were introduced. Technology is also now being 
advanced to integrate behavioural biometrics, including typing speed, touch pad dwell 
time, key selection, and angle of mouse movements into mobile devices and web 
applications to build further confidence in authentication processes.  
 To summarize, the application of behaviour-modifying technology is neither 
new nor novel. Such technologies have progressively evolved, particularly in response 
to the criminal exploitation of payment instruments and user-associated problems. 
This position is correct even if regulatory motivations are unclear or when regulatory 
intentions are not clearly spelt out. It would be sensible to argue that the nature of 
complex regulatory environments often means that regulation has varying degrees of 
transparency. Whether noticeable or not, regulation is justified by the need to protect 
the regulated entity and others.137 Therefore, one may view technologies that lock in 
or restrict user choices and preferences as a means of protecting the users even from 
themselves, while at the same time achieving the interests of government and industry 
in regulating behaviour. In effect, enrolling user biometrics for account authentication 
as in the case of the BVN, will not in and of itself be illegitimate. However, to ensure 
the effectiveness of users in the regulatory framework, the law must also ensure that 
providers are transparent and accountable.  
 As examples, while it would be quite arbitrary for the law to impose limitations 
on how consumers transfer their personal information, law can set standards of 
behaviour sought to be locked in in the first place. Therefore, law could define what 
constitutes personal information in order to identify the information that providers are 
obliged to protect. Additionally, legal requirements that the most effective or up-to±date 
technical safeguard be used may form the basis for integrating biometric technologies 
into payment instruments and processes and for securing access to the biometric 
                                                          
137 A D Murray The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment (2007 
Routledge Cavendish) at 23. 
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databases. Without such laws, the risk of fraud arising from data breaches, or 
organisational misuse of data corresponds to the benefits provided by the lock-in 
technologies. In other words, consumers of the services could be locked into a false 
sense of security if criminals can gain access to identity databases. Arguably, in such 
circumstances, criminals would have less need of the information that technology 
protects.  
 Furthermore, laws would be needed to set out evidential requirements to 
establish that correct security protocols have been implemented into payment 
instruments or processes that have lock-in effects. The cases of Job and Rahman 
highlight the need for transparent rules on evidence when security protocols are in 
question. The proposed Nigerian electronic identity card mentioned earlier also 
clarifies the point here. It was noted that the identity card would be embedded with 
payment functionalities. Conversely, one of the proposed security features of the card 
is the deployment of firewall technology to separate and protect the financial 
information on the card.
138 It is therefore possible to argue that unless the protocols 
used to implement such a separation are ascertainable and verifiable, allegations of 
unauthorised access may be difficult to resolve. 
 Based on our analysis, the security for e-payments depicted in (Figure 1) below 
shows how regulation should be framed to enable law to affect each modality within 
the regulatory schema.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 e-payment regulation based on the theory of modalities of control  
As shown in Figure 1, the law is at the apex of the regulatory schema. Industry follows 
because it can readily modify technology. Therefore, direct regulation of industry by 
                                                          
138 See Nigeria National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), Facts about the National 
e-ID Card available at: https://www.nimc.gov.ng/?q=facts-about-national-e-id-card (last 
accessed 12/03/2016). 
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law would promote the development of high technical standards for security. Having 
derived its legitimacy from legal rules, technology can be used to constrain user 
behaviour. To cite a few of many possible examples, data protection law may provide 
that organisations use the most up-to-date, if not state-of-the-art, technology to protect 
personal information. Additionally, laws regulating electronic payment services may 
impose liability on providers in certain circumstances where authentication or 
authorisation is contested. Digital signature laws may allocate evidential value to 
electronic signatures, and identity management laws would ensure that all 
organisations, irrespective of sector, implement strong identity management 
standards.  
 There are two reasons why the regulatory modalities must operate in the order 
proposed above. One, the order is important to address the peculiar nature of 
technology and cyberspace and the inability of the law to directly affect users and 
technology as modalities of regulation. For example, the law has no direct impact on 
user behaviour, but technology does. Although technology standards may be 
translated into legal rules, laws cannot directly regulate technology because 
technology is evolving, and the volatility of technology means security mechanisms 
become elementary and outdated quickly. However, since industry can readily modify 
technology, direct regulation of industry by law would promote the development of high 
technical standards for data security. The order therefore allows the development of 
specific rules that may be modified as technology evolves. Two, the order ensures that 
in any case, the rule-making process starts with explicit efforts of the state rather than 
industry. Thus, while not effectively displacing private ordering such as the PCIDSS, it 
does not also require the codification of the standards to achieve desirable security 
standards. In effect, while involving the state in the regulatory arrangement, the 
regulatory framework dispenses with the assumption that industry will ultimately write 
the same rules as the regulator, rather, it promotes legal standards in favour of 
considerable discretion of the target over internal systems. This point distinguishes the 
proposed framework in this paper from intermediate regulation such as meta-
regulation. Meta-UHJXODWLRQ DOVR RIWHQ UHIHUUHG WR DV ³PDQGDWHG VHOI-UHJXODWLRQ´ RU
³HQIRUFHGVHOI-UHJXODWLRQ´LQYROYHVHIIRUWVE\JRYHUQPHQWDODXWKRULWLHVWRSURPRWe and 
oversee self-regulation. As we have demonstrated, the public interests at stake 
undermine an assumption that industry will develop rules congruent to the state. 
Therefore, a main problem with meta-regulation, also demonstrated in the analysis of 
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the PCIDSS, is that even if businesses have better information to find solutions to 
public interest problems, they do not necessarily have better incentives to do so.139  
We also argue that discretion is undermined by the inability ² regardless of willingness 
² of industry, to protect public goods, or develop legal principles relating to standards 
of proof and fairness and transparency. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of whether regulation is legitimate or effective must be answered 
regarding how it addresses the principal characteristics of good regulation and how it 
meets public interest requirements underpinning regulatory activities. In this article, we 
have argued that although non-state actors now function as regulatory agents for e-
payment systems, their effectiveness is limited because e-payment is a 
heterogeneous market. Therefore, unless banking rules that require compliance with 
industry private ordering are generally accepted and recognised, private ordering in e-
payments may grapple with questions of legitimacy. Furthermore, because market 
constraints ² such as information asymmetry and externalities² can undermine even 
the most effective self-regulatory regimes, it is necessary for law to intervene in the 
regulatory process. The analysis of technical standards for security highlights the fact 
that given the self-H[HFXWLQJ QDWXUH RI WHFKQRORJ\ RU FRGH DQG WKH LQGXVWU\¶V
expertise in developing and implementing technical standards, technology could be 
quite effective as a regulatory mechanism. However, the effectiveness of technical 
standards is also limited because the standards themselves may not apply across the 
broad spectrum of e-payment services. What becomes clearer from a consideration of 
/HVVLJ¶V WKHRU\ RI PRGDOLWLHV RI FRQWURO LQ F\EHUVSDFH DUH WKH SHUils of technology-
based solutions. While conceding that technology plays a fundamental role in 
regulating activities online and admittLQJ WKDW ³FRGH LV ODZ´ /HVVLJ underlines the 
malleability of technology to abuses and underscores the need for legal regulation of 
technology and the industry that produces the technology.  
 Therefore, because industry has the tendency to manipulate technology and 
abusive use can distort perceptions of fairness and justice, laws must be developed 
not only to set general standards of technical security but also to build accountability, 
                                                          
139 6HH & &RJOLDQHVH DQG ( 0HQGHOVRQ ³0HWD-regulation and Self-5HJXODWLRQ´ 3HQQ /DZ
School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-11) at 16. 
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due process, and even legitimacy into the regulatory process. As the article further 
suggests, preventing crime and correcting market failures as well as building trust and 
confidence in electronic transactions through transparent rules and fair adjudication of 
contentious cases are public policy issues that override private ordering in e-payment 
systems. Therefore, government must intervene with rules, setting liability standards 
so that industry does not use technology to either displace the burden of proof or avoid 
liability altogether. Because market efficiency is a public good, formal laws are required 
to correct market failures and displace externalities as broader public interest 
concerns, which are not necessarily the focus of private ordering systems. Legal 
regulation as we have demonstrated is justified, not only because law is the most 
obvious self-conscious agent of regulation, but also because it infuses accountability, 
due process, and legitimacy, as well as efficiency into the regulatory process.  
 Significantly, the analyses and findings in the article suggest that the proposed 
regulatory framework has a wider application beyond Nigeria. For example, Kenya with 
its widespread adoption of M-pesa, Ghana and Tanzania, which are currently 
developing electronic means of payment, as well as South Africa, which has the most 
developed e-payment systems in the African continent, all share similarities in 
demographics and security and regulatory challenges. The countries all have an 
increasing population migrating to e-payments with the subsequent global threat 
posed by cybercrime. They also share a regulatory system based largely on narrow 
financial industry-driven initiatives. The proposals in this article could therefore be 
applied to e-payment processes, instruments, and institutions in countries facing 
similar challenges.  For regulatory arrangements more generally, we suggest that 
while private ordering is not inherently inefficient, its efficiency must be examined in 
the context of respective activities subject to regulation. Also, when intervening in the 
regulation of a largely heterogeneous activity, government needs to develop uniform 
rules in the form of general principles rather than specific rules. In the technology 
environment such principles must address the malleable and evolving nature of 
technology and the unpredictability of the regulatory environment.  
 
 
